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ABSTRACT
Nietzsche frequently mentions gratitude throughout The Gay Science, but there is a lack
of critical attention to this theme. The present essay seeks to situate this important theme in
relation to other major themes of the work in order to show why gratitude is Nietzsche’s
response to the death of god. Ultimately, I show that there are at least three elements to
Nietzsche’s gratitude in this work: gratitude for perspectival flexibility, gratefulness to the chaos
of existence, and gratefulness that “God is dead!” The essay concludes by highlighting three
aphorisms which could extend this analysis further.
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1

INTRODUCTION

In the Preface to the second edition of The Gay Science (1886), Nietzsche informs readers
that “Gratitude flows forth incessantly” from the book (1). It is “as if that which was most
unexpected had just happened”—he claims he has recovered from something and that this
recovery was not anticipated. His is thus the “gratitude of a convalescent” (1). This work touches
on some of Nietzsche’s best-known themes, the death of god and the collapse of western values.
In light of these topics, gratitude strikes one as a strange psychological attitude to hold.
It is important to keep in mind that Nietzsche does not blindly reject the Christian God.
That is to say, while he appears to celebrate and even welcome the death of god (GS 343), he is
well aware that this event is also tragic. In GS 125, for example, his madman laments, “The
holiest and the mightiest thing the world has ever possessed has bled to death under our knives.”1
Nietzsche is well aware that the waning influence of the Christian religion in western society
means the loss of meaning and direction. We should not assume that the madman is expressing
precisely what Nietzsche thinks, but should rather read this character as indicating Nietzsche’s
awareness of a tragic element of the death of god. I note this at the outset to point out that
Nietzsche’s gratitude does not come out of ignoring some of the darker themes present in GS,
but from a capacity to confront them without avoiding the consequences.
It will be the aim of this paper to show that Nietzsche’s gratitude, as we find it here in
GS, involves an ability to deal with a world in which the source of western Christian values is
being (has been) destabilized. Importantly, rather than celebrating a new-found or replacement
set of values, Nietzsche’s gratitude in this work emerges from the ability to do without values—
or, as he says metaphorically, after the death of god, “finally our ships may set out again, set out
1

This claim finds support from works throughout Nietzsche’s productive career. For example, in EH (1888)
“Destiny” 8, he writes that the “uncovering of Christian morality is an event without equal, a real catastrophe.”
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to face any danger” (GS 343). Setting out to sea here suggests living in the absence of a stable set
of values. Nietzsche sees an opportunity in the collapse of western values, but he is not unaware
of the disastrous consequences of this collapse.
The role of gratitude in this work is complex and requires a fair amount of background
information about Nietzsche’s project in GS. Indeed, I’ve already introduced a few terms like the
death of god and the collapse of western values—certainly not self-explanatory Nietzschean
notions. These concepts—along with Nietzsche’s sickness and health metaphors and his thinking
regarding physicalism and how philosophers obtain perspectives—require a proper introduction.
Thus, the first sections of the paper will be devoted to outlining what we will call philosophical
sickness in order to suggest that gratitude as a psychological attitude, given the waning influence
of Christian values that Nietzsche describes in this work, can be understood as a sign of health. I
see a parallel between Nietzsche’s “test,” eternal recurrence—saying yes to the question: would
you relive this life as you have lived it, in every detail, an infinite number of times (GS 341)—
and gratitude. A person’s ability to say yes to the above question is indicative of welldisposedness and therefore a sign of psychological health.2 Likewise, for Nietzsche, gratitude in
an individual shows a well-disposedness to the conditions in which she or he lives. I’ll begin
with a brief introduction to the text and the role of the 1886 Preface in GS. I’ll suggest that
Nietzsche utilizes this second edition, retrospective Preface to give readers something like an
overview of the project of GS and that this overview suggests that gratitude and sickness are
intimately linked: even if only for a brief period of time, physical sickness pushes one to alter

2

There are a variety of perspectives on how one should read eternal recurrence (ER). Paul Loeb presents a
completely different interpretation in an essay in the Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche. He claims that Nietzsche
hoped his “appropriate readers would come to share his belief in the truth of eternal recurrence” (646, my
emphasis). Loeb is suggesting that, rather than a thought experiment to test the psychological well-disposedness
of a person, Nietzsche presents ER as a metaphysical fact about the universe.
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one’s lifestyle (e.g., take more rest, change diet, etc.) and thus can prevent static or permanent
habits. As I’ll show, Nietzsche places great value on this lack of static habits because it means an
individual is forced into various bodily conditions, all of which come with different perspectives
on life (GS P 3, 295). Indeed, he tells us in the GS Preface that “A philosopher who has passed
through many kinds of health, and keeps passing through them again and again, has passed
through an equal number of philosophies” (3). Precisely this shifting between perspectives is an
object of Nietzsche’s gratitude because it signifies the ability to live without needing to hold one
perspective, an ability to be flexible. It is in this context that he asks, “And as for illness: are we
not almost tempted to ask whether we can do without it at all?” (GS P 3).
In this 1886 edition, Nietzsche gives us a fifth book, a collection of poems, and a
retrospective preface. This latter is written in the same spirit as other of Nietzsche’s 1886
prefaces—e.g., in Human All Too Human and Daybreak—which serve the function of brief and
often cryptic overviews of these books. In the second aphorism of the Preface, Nietzsche tells us
that “in the best case” philosophy emerges from “the voluptuousness of a triumphant gratitude.”
As I’ll seek to show, this philosophizing from a place of gratitude is to be contrasted with the
“sick thinkers,” who appear to use their philosophy as a kind of crutch. For this latter class,
philosophy is a need and is used as “a sedative, medicine, redemption, elevation, or selfalienation” (2). The next two sections will be devoted, respectively, to explaining Nietzsche’s
physicalism (2) and his notion of philosophical sickness (3) in order to present necessary
background information. I’ll then move into the death of god (4) and a “catastrophe” (5) that
Nietzsche thinks any intellectual searching for truth will encounter and have to deal with. Section
6 will tie these themes together and consider Nietzsche’s gratitude regarding the perspectival
flexibility from three angles: gratitude (A) ‘for’, grateful (B) ‘to’ and (C) ‘that’. This section will
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also hint at three aphorisms which could expand this topic and will be essential to any further
explication of gratitude in this work.

2

NIETZSCHE’S PHYSICALISM

For Nietzsche, all thinking arises out of “physiological needs” (2). Philosophy does not
take place in an objective realm where premises and conclusions are seen without influence from
the physiology of the body. Nietzsche, along with Darwin, Marx and many others, belongs
roughly to a move in the 19th century which seeks to explain human behavior in scientific, rather
than religious or non-disconfirmable metaphysical terms. In general, this approach involves
observation of human behavior and human reasoning and abstains from appealing to
metaphysical explanations to ground its claims.
As early as Human, All Too Human (1878) we find Nietzsche very interested in this
mode of inquiry. For example, Nietzsche draws an analogy between moral concepts and
chemical compounds: just as a chemical can be explained by appealing to its constituent
elements, so too might “moral, religious, and aesthetic” conceptions be explained in terms of
causal factors instead of “eternal facts” or “absolute truths” (HH 1, 2). Importantly, these types
of material or scientific explanations have the effect of demystifying that which they explain;
they postulate the act of thinking in terms of the bodily processes which drive them. Thinking, on
this account, is a material process. This is Nietzsche’s physicalism and it is extended and applied
through his next published work, Daybreak (1881), where he interprets various character types
through this physicalist lens. It remains an important way of explaining human behavior
throughout Nietzsche’s productive career.

5

Nietzsche effectively seeks to collapse the distinction between mind and body so that one
no longer speaks of a dualism between them. This makes the traditional perspective that the mind
(and thus the thoughts that flow from it) is above or is morally superior to the body—whose
fleshly desires only impede the process of rational inquiry—seem questionable at the very least.
The body and the mind are thus part of one system and interact with each other.3 Nietzsche’s
motive here is to destabilize the elevated role that the mind has had in the history of philosophy.
Thus, when Nietzsche tells us that perhaps “philosophy has been no more than an
interpretation of the body and a misunderstanding of the body,” he is at least in part referring to
the following: philosophers have missed an important aspect of what the act of thinking is by not
first understanding themselves as physiological creatures. This understanding is important for
philosophers to possess because it means that, as human beings, their physiology and
psychological constitution influence their tendencies toward particular philosophical
conclusions. In a sense, they have jumped into the world of ideas without asking what in
themselves initially pushed them to their conclusions and perspectives. Here we can see that
Nietzsche is connecting a physical or bodily condition to a philosophical condition in a very
explicit way.

3

PHILOSOPHICAL SICKNESS

A section from GS Preface 2 provides insight into what philosophical sickness is and how
Nietzsche sees it manifesting in philosophy.
Every philosophy that ranks peace above war, every ethic with a negative definition of
happiness, every metaphysics and physics that knows some finale, a final state of some sort,
every predominantly aesthetic or religious craving for some Apart, Beyond, Outside, Above,
permits the question whether it was not illness that inspired the philosopher. The unconscious
3

In GS, Nietzsche does not insist on a distinction between the mind and body in any technical sense.
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disguise of physiological needs under the cloaks of the objective, ideal, purely spiritual goes
frighteningly far [...].

What we see with each of the examples Nietzsche provides here is a will to some kind of stasis—
that is, a static or permanent structuring of values. Each of these systems seeks a clear, neat table
of values according to which one may act and against which actions may be judged. There are
three instances of this sickness in the above quote: the first two examples appear to be aimed at
eliminating discomfort and chaos. One assumes that with peace, the world would be less filled
with suffering and bloodshed. Similarly, a negative definition of happiness (e.g., Utilitarianism)
might claim happiness consists in the absence of pain.4 The obvious underlying value here is that
a world without suffering and pain is more valuable or likable.5
The second example (metaphysics and physics) represents a desire to have some telos,
some goal or end, toward which humankind can work. This kind of stability would, of course,
clarify difficult questions about what kind of life one should live in order to achieve this “finale.”
And the third example—this craving for a beyond—calls to mind the ascetic, who sees a deficit
in her- or himself and longs for some metaphysical realm to which they could eventually ascend

4

Dr. Jessica Berry has brought further support for these points to my attentions by directing me to EH “Destiny” 4:
“To consider all forms of distress as objections, as things that need to be done away with, is the niaiserie par
excellence [highest folly], a real disaster in its consequences, a destiny of stupidity [...]. In the great economy of the
whole, the horrors of reality [...] are incalculably more necessary than that form of petty happiness called
‘goodness’ [...].” Here Nietzsche is claiming that events or circumstances that we traditionally label negative or bad
should be seen as essential in the sense that they cannot be extracted from life.
5 According to Bernard William’s introduction to the Cambridge edition of GS, Nietzsche possessed “a total refusal
to forget, not only the existence of suffering, but the fact that suffering was necessary to everything that he and
anyone else valued. ‘All good things come from bad things’ is one of his fundamental tenets” (xiv). Williams is
pointing out that Nietzsche sees suffering as a fundamental and, indeed, important part of life. Without suffering
humans would perhaps not be able to create and appreciate “art, self-understanding, [and] nobility of character”
because these “cannot in common honesty be separated from the knowledge of the horrors that have been
involved in bringing these things about” (xiv).
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and be made whole.6 The ascetic seeks to rid herself of some quality which has been defined by a
religion or philosophy as morally unacceptable or wrong. For Nietzsche, the ascetic essentially
denies life by imagining that a better world would be one in which this undesirable aspect of
herself were not present. If we grant the thesis that every element of character is necessary, in the
sense that the interaction of this combination of character traits creates the person, so that the
person could not be any way other than how they are, then to will any part of this
characterological constellation away is to wish oneself to be other than one is. For Nietzsche, this
is not wrong in a moral sense, but he thinks this ascetic attitude betrays shame and disgust
toward oneself and is thus a marker of psychological illness. Similarly, needing the world to be
different than it is, needing human life to be unchanging and without distress, and philosophizing
out of this need—this act betrays an inability or unwillingness to confront the circumstances of
human existence (misery, uncertainty, disappointment, failure at times).
As Nietzsche points out in the final sentence of the above-quoted passage, each of these
examples can come with very sophisticated philosophical systems which might appear sound,
but which “permit” the question of whether the individual was philosophizing from illness.7
Nietzsche thinks they permit this question of illness because he reads the tendency in the history

6

In his 2008 book, Bernard Reginster provides a clear example of the Christian ascetic (along with Platonism, one
of two perspectives which he claims negates life). This perspective encourages us to believe that “our life in this
world is real, and so is the suffering essential to it, but it is a mere transition to another form of existence, one that
is not only free from the objectionable features of this life…but will also make up for them” (48). The Christian
ascetic perceives this life as a “bridge” to a better life, and thus “turn[s] against itself”—turns against its current
and only verifiable life (48; Nietzsche GM III 11). The ascetic seeks to deny this life, perhaps because entry into the
other, better, more static world hinges upon properly displaying that one is opposed to this life.
7 ‘Permits’ is important here. Nietzsche is very hard to assign positions to because he very rarely writes “I think X.”
He will rather phrase his thinking in terms of possibilities or hypotheticals. ‘Permits’ thus means that the question
is allowed, not that it is necessary, or that these philosophies must be the result of sick thinking. The important
point is that Nietzsche chooses his words carefully, and this is one instance of that caution. By approaching
philosophy from this, what we might call agnostic position, Nietzsche is able to avoid committing himself
completely. This is in line with his dislike of dogmatic positions that, he suggests, betray a need to know that one
possesses the truth (C.f., GS 110, 347).
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of philosophy to seek rational stability within philosophical systems as signifying an abhorrence
of a chaotic world (GS P 2). The world, for Nietzsche, is chaotic and constantly changing and he
sees in these philosophical systems a desire to achieve a stasis (GS 109). In the same way that we
might imagine a reduction in anxiety resulting from mapping a previously unknown territory, so
these philosophers seek to map existence, presumably to achieve some sort of direction for
action—an answer to questions like: What should I do? Why am I here? And so on. Nietzsche
warns against this postulation of rational stability. In an aphorism warning against many
metaphysical propositions, he claims that “the development of the organic [is] the exception of
exceptions” (GS 109). Nietzsche is saying here that the fact that human beings exist at all is mere
chance. When one considers the circumstances necessary for life to emerge on earth, and one
remains agnostic regarding a deity having created the universe, one can only marvel at the
amazing odds for (human) life to have emerged.8 For him, “the character of the world…is for all
eternity chaos” (GS 109). The values and metaphysical claims about the world that religions and
philosophical systems have proposed have not reflected the way human beings actually operate
in the world, but have come from systems which have, at least in part, sought to make human life
appear less chaotic, less random, less a result of chance. Philosophical sickness is the need to
postulate these metaphysical truths in order to live one’s life. It is an attempt to avoid the fact
that existence is full of randomness and that values are not objectively grounded. It is the need to
know that one is in possession of some truth about existence which can guide one’s life.
By the time Nietzsche adds a fifth book to GS (1887), he has clarified what sickness is
and relates it to strength and weakness. In an aphorism entitled, “Believers and their need to
believe” he writes, “The extent to which one needs a faith in order to flourish, how much that is

8

Nietzsche’s agnosticism will be covered in the next section.
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‘firm’ and that one does not want shaken because one clings to it—that is the measure of the
degree of one’s strength (or, to speak more clearly, one’s weakness)” (GS 347). By “faith”
Nietzsche does not necessarily mean faith in a god. He is speaking more generally about faith in
the truth of one’s values or beliefs—be they moral, religious, philosophical, or more generally
intellectual. Nietzsche values a kind of flexibility in perspectives on the world, on human life;
and the “need” to have the true, right, correct belief is a sign of rigidity that cannot survive
confrontation with the full range of life experiences. As we will see in the next two sections,
after the influence of Christianity has waned, Nietzsche thinks that those who will flourish will
be those who can embrace this flexibility. Section 6 will show that this flexibility is precisely
what Nietzsche is grateful for.
We will now turn to the death of god, a topic that has received much critical attention. GS
approaches the catastrophe of the death of the Christian God as a central theme and Nietzsche’s
gratitude should not only be read as gratitude for this event, but gratitude that he possesses the
ability to face the chaos of existence and the lack of grounding of values and not need to seek a
“solution” to the death of the Christian God. For him, and perhaps others of the proper character
type, gratitude comes out of the ability to live without attachment to a particular faith.

4

THE DEATH OF GOD

This is perhaps Nietzsche’s most widely-known and misunderstood themes. We see it
emerge three separate times in GS. The first appearance is in GS 108. Here, Nietzsche gives
readers a brief hint at this seemingly vague notion:
New Battles.—After Buddha was dead, they still showed his shadow in a cave for centuries—a
tremendous, gruesome shadow. God is dead; but given the way people are, there may still for
millennia be caves in which they show his shadow.—And we—we must still defeat his shadow
as well!

10

Here Nietzsche states that “God is dead,” but gives readers no real explanation. In suggesting
that there may be millennia during which his shadow is shown, he seems to mean that despite
this death, there will be “caves”—perhaps segments of western culture—which still believe in
this god or in which his “shadow,” Christian morality, can still be found. This aphorism is the
first of Book III—the book in which Nietzsche presents a literary explanation of the death of god
just a few pages later—so it seems that this aphorism might serve as a means of introducing a
concept which Nietzsche will return to.
And indeed he does. The second occurrence of the theme is GS 125, in which a madman
appears in a marketplace early in the morning and says he is looking for god. The crowd around
him laughs and makes fun of the man. The madman jumps “into their midst and [pierces] them
with his eyes,” claiming “God is dead! God remains dead! and we have killed him!” The
madman, in a hardly forgettable rant, asks the shocked listeners, “But how did we do this? How
were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon?
What were we doing when we unchained the earth from its sun?” These questions reveal the
madman’s realization of the significance of the event and his lack of understanding of the cause.
Yet he seems to communicate, with much literary flair, that the consequences are disorientation
and a loss of direction—the destruction or wiping away of the horizon—and he assigns blame to
all present, including himself (“we,” he says).
For Nietzsche, the death of god does not simply symbolize the waning influence of a
Christian God in Western culture—what we might call secularization—but a loss of the
possibility that anything can be as important or holy as this god once was. To this point
Nietzsche’s madman laments: “How can we console ourselves, the murderers of all murderers!

11

The holiest and mightiest thing the world has ever possessed has bled to death under our knives”
(GS 125). It is not simply that we now know that prayers go unanswered, but that the belief that
we live in the kind of universe in which there could be an answer has been lost, killed.
Nietzsche’s madman hints at this loss of direction with his dramatic questions: “Where is it
moving to now? Where are we moving to? Away from all suns? Are we not continually
falling?”9 There is a clear sense that without this god, this guiding force in the culture, there is
now a sense of lost direction and deep disorientation.
In the opening aphorism of Book V of GS, the third appearance of this death of god
theme, Nietzsche gives readers a clearer picture of what it means: “The greatest recent event—
that ‘God is dead’; that the belief in the Christian God has become unbelievable—is already
starting to cast its first shadow over Europe” (343, my emphasis). Importantly, Nietzsche is not
claiming that there is no god—he is not making an atheistic argument.10 To do this, he would
need to make metaphysical claims about the nature of the universe in order to argue that it is
incompatible with a Christian God. There are many examples of this kind of argument in the
history of philosophy; for example, the classic argument from evil.11 Nietzsche’s approach to

9

Nietzsche’s sun metaphor here might be compared with Plato’s allegory of the cave, where the sun represents
the form of the Good which, by shining, illuminates Truth. The sense of detachment from a sun—and Nietzsche’s
comments in other places (e.g., GS 343)—that with the death of god “some kind of sun seems to have set,”
strengthens a reading that claims the death of god to be a deeper loss than the waning influence of religious
beliefs.
10 As Janaway (2013) suggests, “neither complacent unthinking atheism nor the ‘heavy’ desperation of the
madman can be a final resting place for Nietzsche” (256). Both of the two options Janaway mentions here are too
rigid for Nietzsche, who wants to avoid hardline judgements such as these.
11 The argument from evil runs as follows:
a. The Christian God is all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good.
b. This God knows of evil in the world, is capable of extricating it, and is, by definition (all-good),
required to do so.
c. There is evil in the world.
Therefore,
d. There is no God of the description in premise a.
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philosophy tends more toward psychological investigation than abstract syllogisms. That is, he is
mainly concerned with how and what peoples, cultures, and eras think and value. Rather than
claiming that there is no God, Nietzsche claims that—based on signs he sees in the culture—the
Christian God is no longer believable. This is not a claim about the nature of the universe, but a
claim about the values of the culture.12 It is therefore agnostic in that it abstains from making a
claim about the actual existence of god. Indeed, Nietzsche’s move here makes the metaphysical
position irrelevant: the consequences of this loss of belief will be the same whether a god exists
or not. The death of god is the loss of belief in him, thus his is a death in the collective mind of a
culture.
In GS 343, Nietzsche tells readers more about the consequences of this event: “How
much must collapse because it was built on this faith, leaned on it, had grown into it—for
example, our entire European morality” (343). This sentence shows Nietzsche acknowledging
the sick thinkers’ fear of a world without stable and static values: a world after the death of
god—this “greatest recent event”—does not provide the clarity regarding moral decisions or life
direction that philosophers had presumably hoped for (GS 343). In other words, the death of god
does not simply represent the loss of a belief in a Christian God, but a loss of the ability to
believe in a universe that could have universal values—those that apply to everyone and are
absolutely right or wrong. Thus, this death is the death of belief in a basis for concrete, clear and
objective values. While for the Christian, the death of god means the waning influence of this

This argument claims that we live in a particular kind of universe (one in which evil is present) and that a God of
the above description and evil cannot coexist. There are, of course, many complications regarding definitions (God,
evil, etc.) and many responses.
12 It is important to note that both Nietzsche’s madman in GS 125 and his remarks in GS 343 explicitly convey that
“this tremendous event is still on its way”—that for many people in the culture, the waning influence of the
Christian God has not yet become apparent (GS 125). In GS 343, Nietzsche remarks that he and other free spirits
“look forward to this darkening,” again suggesting that the consequences are still to come. The event is the death
and the consequences seem to come later, seem slowly to unfold.
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god, for the philosopher it means the loss of unchanging values. One can no longer appeal to a
universal ground of values because it is precisely this ground that has been lost, killed at the
hands of western culture. And this death leaves a void—one that “has probably never before
existed on earth” (GS 343). Nietzsche reads god as a universal ground for values—that is, as the
final arbiter of right and wrong. And he encounters philosophies that claim not to be explicitly
religious but that still have a kind of place holder which serves the end of grounding universal
values—for example, reason in Kant’s categorical imperative, or a teleology of progressive
advancement of degrees of freedom, as we find in Hegel. These are absolutes—aspects of
philosophical systems which are held to be true and form the basis of these systems—in the
sense that they underlie the claims of these thinkers.13 This type of philosophical move can be
seen as repackaging god in one form or another, and Nietzsche’s madman’s declaration that god
is dead suggests that this ground for values—either explicitly or implicitly titled god—has been
exhausted and shown to be unstable.
Significantly, Nietzsche claims later in Book V that it was “the concept of truthfulness
that was taken ever more rigorously…that actually triumphed over the Christian god” (GS 357).
Truthfulness—a concept that Nietzsche links explicitly with Christianity—eventually began to
chip away at the very system which held it up as such a prime virtue. Nietzsche sees the concept
of truthfulness—a drive toward accuracy in beliefs and values—as being “translated and
sublimated” into the discipline of science, and even sees science as at least partially rooted in
Christianity because of its commitment to the value of truth (GS 357). In GS 37, he suggests that
one reason science was promoted throughout the preceding centuries (presumably, roughly, the

13

To his credit, Hegel tried to be somewhat empirical with his claims—by reviewing the progression of events
throughout history. Perhaps the error Nietzsche might point out here is faith in the extrapolation of this
advancement of degrees of freedom into the future.
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15th through the 19th) was that a more accurate understanding of the world would provide a better
understanding of “God’s goodness and wisdom.” The assumption underlying the advancement of
science in this perspective is that God exists behind the world somehow, waiting to be
discovered through scientific inquiry and a more precise understanding of the “laws” of nature.
At some point, there was a bridge between Christian truthfulness and the motives of the scientific
thinker: the “father confessor’s refinement of the Christian conscience, translated and sublimated
into a scientific conscience, into intellectual cleanliness at any price” (GS 357). Nietzsche here
suggests that the Christian virtue of truth—believing in one true God, confessing or admitting to
one’s sins, and so on—is clearly linked with the value of truth in scientific inquiry. His claim is
that a split occurs between the scientific inquiry into truth and the Christian drive to clean one’s
conscience, forcing Christianity and scientific inquiry into separate spheres which appear at odds
with each other. The result of this conflict, this split, is “an animal” that has a tension between a
need to know why it exists (GS 1)—and the truth drive, which constantly destabilizes the sources
of these ‘whys.’
It is precisely in the thinker that this conflict plays itself out with the greatest intensity.
And I will now explore this figure of the thinker—the person in whom the split is most
profoundly visible and catastrophic—in order to explicate the intricacies of this Nietzschean
gratitude.

5

THE THINKER AND THE CATASTROPHE

While Nietzsche is unclear as to whether the thinker refers to philosophers, scientists, or
all those engaged in intellectual pursuits, it is likely that he means the latter—all those engaged
in intellectual pursuits. In GS 110 he mentions “the thinker” and my working definition will be
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one who takes the acquisition of truth to be primary. Philosophers, scientists, and intellectuals
generally comprise this category. Nietzsche locates this figure in the middle of a crisis as the one
who will probably be most affected by the death of god: it is the thinker who has been driven by
the desire to ascertain the truths of existence—whatever those might be. One need not reach far
to find evidence that philosophy has, at least to some extent, justified itself as a discipline on the
grounds that it can disclose or discover truths about existence, the world, etc., and it is therefore
this motive of truth-finding that philosophers have (generally speaking) held up as their prime
motive. But this desire for truth is not confined to philosophy: Nietzsche tells us that at some
point in human history, “knowledge and the striving for the truth finally took their place as a
need among the other needs” (GS 110). Acquisition of truth became not simply a hobby, but
eventually a condition for life—a “need.” Once this need appeared, it was only a matter of time
until a serious collision occurred: “finally knowledge and the ancient basic errors struck against
each other, both as life, both as power, both in the same person. The thinker—that is the being in
whom the drive to truth and those life-preserving errors are fighting their first battle” (GS 110).
This “battle” will be distressing for the philosopher, who, we are told in GS 110, literally has
opposing drives—both of which are necessary for survival. Hence, “In relation to the
significance of this battle, everything else is a matter of indifference” (GS 110).
The very person who hoped to uncover the truths of existence is forced to confront an
ironic and weighty question: “to what extent can truth stand to be incorporated?” (109).
Nietzsche is warning that this inquiry into truth might not be as easy as had previously been
thought. The results of this inquiry—destabilized beliefs in social progress through seeing the
plausibility and desirability of this progress as an assumption or the emergence of increasingly
biological understandings of human nature, which tend toward viewing humans as essentially
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animals—will be difficult to tolerate. The difficulty in tolerating this knowledge is that it makes
comforting metaphysical and religious explanations of human nature less convincing.
Nietzsche’s next declarative sentence in GS 110—“that is the question; that is the experiment”—
should be taken to mean that the crux of his project in GS is to confront this very collision. This
collision between truth and the beliefs that Nietzsche sees it as having destabilized is the
catastrophe the thinker must deal with.
The weight of this question—to what extent can truth stand to be incorporated?—is not
something all thinkers can handle, but it seems to be one that Nietzsche thinks philosophers of
the future will be unable to avoid. It is this question that undergirds the abhorrence the sick
thinker has for a lack of stability regarding values: perhaps insight into truth or truths about what
it is to be human will not bring peace, will not still the chaos of existence, will not disclose the
“toward what” of all morality, but will rather display the heaviness and ambiguity of life without
these truths. We will now turn away from the background themes and dive directly into
Nietzschean gratitude.

6

CONCLUSIONS REGARDING NIETZSCHE’S GRATITUDE

A. Gratitude ‘for’: coping with the death of god
We have seen that Nietzsche reads a person’s—and especially a thinker’s—“need” to
believe as a measure of their strength—or lack thereof—and that philosophical sickness consists,
on this account, in needing to believe that one knows the truth (GS 347). This need does not
allow one to be flexible and vary perspectives—which Nietzsche sees as essential after the death
of god, especially for the thinker. This thinker seems to be approaching an inevitable collision
between the need to acquire truth and the difficulty in its acquisition. We can ask now: in the
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midst of this process—the waning influence of an irreplaceable god, the impossibility of future
holiness, and the realization that progress toward truth does not validate traditionally flattering
perspectives on human nature—in the midst of this, why is Nietzsche grateful? As we noted in
the introduction above, it is not as if Nietzsche is unaware of the tragedy in this death. As early
as Human, All Too Human Nietzsche observes that the “cessation of the metaphysical outlook”
brings an over focus on the individual lifespan and that the consequential unimportance given to
the establishment of institutions “intended to last for centuries” is essentially a “disadvantage”
(22). Nietzsche has thus been dealing with this theme for quite some time and has observed the
difficulty that results from it. The question, in other words, is what does Nietzsche have to be
grateful for when he seems clearly to acknowledge that a crisis is at hand?
Nietzsche sees himself as uniquely positioned to confront this crisis, and this ability
comes out of his erratic health and a physiology which seems to require brief habits. He
expresses gratitude for his physical constitution early in Book IV of GS in an aphorism worth
quoting in its entirety.
Brief habits. — I love brief habits and consider them invaluable means for getting to know many
things and states down to the bottom of their sweetness and bitterness; my nature is designed
entirely for brief habits, even in the needs of its physical health and generally as far as I can see
at all, from the lowest to the highest. I always believe this will give me lasting satisfaction—even
brief habits have this faith of passion, this faith in eternity—and that I am to be envied for having
found and recognized it, and now it nourishes at noon and in the evening and spreads a deep
contentment around itself and into me, so that I desire nothing else, without having to compare,
despise, or hate. And one day its time is up; the good thing parts from me, not as something that
now disgusts me but peacefully and sated with me, as I with it, and as if we ought to be grateful
to each other and so shake hands and say farewell. And already the new waits at the door along
with my faith—the indestructible fool and sage! —that this new thing will be the right thing, the
last right thing. This happens to me with dishes, thoughts, people, cities, poems, music,
doctrines, daily schedules, and ways of living. Enduring habits, however, I hate, and feel as if a
tyrant has come near me and the air around me is thickening when events take a shape that seems
inevitably to produce enduring habits—for instance, owing to an official position, constant
relations with the same people, a permanent residence, or uniquely good health. Yes, at the very
bottom of my soul I am grateful to all my misery and illness and whatever is imperfect in me
because they provide a hundred back doors through which I can escape enduring habits. To me
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the most intolerable, the truly terrible, would of course be a life entirely without habits, a life that
continually demanded improvisation—that would be my exile and my Siberia (295).

While the sick thinker is trapped by a constant desire for stasis, Nietzsche here suggests that he
has learned throughout his life, based in part on his physiological incompatibility with enduring
habits, to live without these enduring habits, thus to live without the stasis that we discussed
above. As Nietzsche is quick to point out, it is not as if he does not desire stasis or believe at
times that he has found it. He rather is capable of doing without this stasis, which enduring
habits seem to provide. Nietzsche does not give us a direct link between this tendency of his to
move between habits and its importance in confronting the death of god and the resultant
questions, but one obvious effect of this not-sticking-to-habits is that it seems to have trained
Nietzsche in the art of avoiding being trapped, one might say, in a particular perspective.14 As I
noted in section 2 regarding Nietzsche’s physicalism, a person’s physical condition structures the
perspective they hold. Thus, if his physical condition constantly changes, it follows that
Nietzsche’s perspective will also constantly change. Nietzsche’s claim that he says farewell to
these habits and moves on displays his ability not to settle with one habit, but to be able to move
from one to the other. He is grateful for this ability.15

14

The link between perspective and habits or ways of living is clear if we keep in mind Nietzsche’s tendency
toward materialism. While Nietzsche’s move is not quite as strong as Marx’s—that is, Nietzsche is not as
committed to the “truth” of materialism; Nietzsche does turn the idealist on her head by suggesting that material
conditions structure the range of possible perspectives one can hold, as we noted in the discussion regarding
Nietzsche’s physicalism.
Marx and Nietzsche do not exactly use the term materialism in the same sense (and Nietzsche does not explicitly
use it at all in GS, as far as I know), but I use the term here in contrast with idealism in the Hegelian sense. Rather
than seeing humans as creatures who first think and then act based on mind or rationality, both Nietzsche and
Marx see human beings as creatures whose actions (and even ideas) are structured by the material circumstances
of their life. Thus, for Hegel, humans are top-down creatures, capable of thinking and acting based on this thinking.
For Nietzsche and Marx, humans are basically the opposite: thinking follows from material conditions. Perhaps
with regard to materialism Marx and Nietzsche share little beyond this general contrastive definition.
15 It is worth noting that in EH “Wise” 1 Nietzsche cites this ability to move from perspective to perspective as
important to his overall philosophical project: “I have a hand for switching perspectives: the first reason why a
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B. Grateful ‘to’: the chaos of existence
A second important point here is that Nietzsche did not implement the art of holding brief
habits as a strategy himself—he is grateful to his erratic health and “whatever is imperfect in”
him (GS 295). The lack of agency in this picture is of no small import: it further separates
Nietzsche from prescriptionist interpretations—interpretations that claim that he wants to provide
solutions to particular problems. And critics who wish to interpret Nietzsche’s remarks about art
and distancing oneself as a kind of “program” push Nietzsche in this direction.16 In GS 295,
however, he is speaking of his own (chance) capacities. And the fact that they were not actively
selected opens him up to a kind of beauty in life: When one (A) confronts the lack of stasis in
life—or the inability of human beings to acquire stasis while remaining honest (GS110)—and
(B) refrains from assigning responsibility for the outcome of seemingly providential events to a
god (GS 277), then one can see the “music,” the apparent “harmony” in existence. And its beauty
is intensified by the element of chance. One can appreciate the difficulty in life circumstances
unfolding with coherence and can recognize that it was neither personal nor divine agency that
brought this coherence about. Nietzsche’s gratitude here is thus not simply that he believes he
has the ability to live without getting “stuck” in a particular perspective. We must keep in mind
that the fact that he did not choose the conditions of his physical constitution (“misery and
illness”) which have led him to have a nature “entirely designed for brief habits” (GS 295). This

‘revaluation of values’ is even possible, perhaps for me alone.” Again, Dr. Berry drew my attention to this
sentence.
16 For example, Stern (2013) reads Nietzsche’s concept of amor fati—the love of life (GS 276), to be contrasted
with the ascetic mentioned in section 3.—as suggesting the following: because error is a condition of life for
human beings (GS 107) and is thus necessary, the method we have for coping “with our immersion in error” is to
use these “erroneous practices to make this error beautiful” (156). This paints Nietzsche as seeing error as a
problem to be overcome and Stern reads Nietzsche as suggesting that in a world full of uncertainty and error, the
solution, the best one can do, is use error to make this situation beautiful. The prescriptionist interpretation sees
the project of GS as providing a solution to a problem.
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suggests that the chance circumstances of life—what Nietzsche will call “fate” (GS 276, c.f., EH
“Clever” 10)—is also an object of gratitude. Another way of saying this is that Nietzsche is
grateful to life in all its chaos and chance because it is precisely this chance that has given him
the capacity to avoid being stuck in enduring habits (GS 277, 295).
C. Grateful ‘that’: “God is dead!”
Returning to GS 343, Nietzsche tells us that this “greatest recent event—that ‘God is
dead’,” is worthy of gratitude for the “philosophers and the ‘free spirits’.” Indeed, rather than
dreading, these individuals “look forward to this darkening” and “are not at all sad”—and
anticipate surprising consequences: “a new and barely discernible type of light, happiness, relief,
amusement, encouragement, dawn” (GS 343). Nietzsche’s poetic and celebratory language here
is meant to capture an expression of gratefulness toward this event: “our hearts overflow with
gratitude, amazement, forebodings, expectation.” Nietzsche is grateful for this event because it
opens a kind of sea, clears the horizon. He speaks in metaphor, but his meaning is not completely
ambiguous in light of what we have said so far: “finally our ships may set out again, set out to
face any danger…the sea, our sea, lies open again; maybe there has never been such an ‘open
sea’.” As in other places in GS (e.g., 124, 125, 289), the sea metaphor represents this process of
pushing out into a lack of stasis, of seeing the absence of grounding in values and perspectives.
As we noted above, with the death of god comes a void or instability that had not existed before.
When the Greek and Roman gods died, there was a new (Christian) god to take their place. The
catastrophe of the death of the Christian God is therefore heightened by the fact that this death is
not a movement from a single god to a “better” one, but rather from an all-powerful god to none.
In other words, the status that western culture has raised this one god to has increased the
dependency upon it and thus the disappearance of him is more intensely felt. It is like an investor
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who unknowingly puts most of his assets into a Ponzi scheme, thinking he is increasing his
security: his massive investment has made him vulnerable. And he feels it when the bottom falls
out of the market.
The claim that Nietzsche values this variety of perspectives and considers it useful in
dealing with the death of god is supported by a passage in Book III entitled, “The greatest
advantage of polytheism.” Here Nietzsche writes that in polytheism, “one got to see a plurality of
norms: one god was not the denial of or anathema to another god!” (GS 143) Under this
mythological metaphysics, we are told, there was no single normal type of god, and
consequently, no one normal type of human. We should read this as meaning that there were a
variety of approaches to existence, a pantheon of ways to live. Nietzsche contrasts this with
monotheism, “this rigid consequence of the teaching of a normal human type—that is, the belief
in a normal god next to whom there are only false, pseudo-gods” (GS 143). Where polytheism
offers variety, monotheism constricts and preaches a single “normal” type. In line with what we
have said about philosophical sickness, monotheism represents a drive toward a stasis, a oneness,
a singularity. Rather than making space for a variety of approaches to existence, a variety of
perspectives, monotheism constricts and narrows.17 And this constriction represents “the greatest
danger to humanity for far” because it “threatened us with…premature stagnation” (GS 143).
Nietzsche’s comments about the advantages of polytheism should not be taken to mean
that he wants to return to a Homeric mythological metaphysics, however much he praises the
Greeks for their creativity. Nietzsche does not really tell us why polytheism worked for the
Greeks, although he appreciates it as a sign of variety and health (GS 143). As Christianity
emerges, and truth is held up as a supreme value, this monotheistic religion must defend itself
17

Nietzsche praises the discovery of what he calls “new worlds” in GS 289. By “new worlds,” he means a variety of
“overall philosophical [justifications] of [ways] of living and thinking”—that is, a variety of perspectives.
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against threats. This is to say that Christianity must live up to its own value of truth and show
itself to be true—a kind of apologetic theology that Nietzsche does not seem to think was as
central in Greek polytheism. Yet, as we saw in section 4, it was this value that began to
destabilize Christianity. There is thus no return to a cultural condition in which god is a solution
to the dynamic nature of existence. Christianity and science essentially push god as a solution to
its breaking point and Nietzsche sees a god no longer viable (GS 285). Nietzsche’s praise of
polytheism should be taken to mean that this style of metaphysics possessed a type of health to
be contrasted with monotheism. The response to the death of god thus requires that one not
appeal to some kind of stasis, but embrace a of flexibility in perspective.
Nietzsche’s gratitude here is that the conditions of the culture have forced the thinker to
confront the facts of existence—e.g., misery and other difficult feelings, the implausibility of
flattering metaphysical pictures of human nature—yet dealing with this by appealing to a god is
no longer an option. Under these precise conditions, Nietzsche suggests, humanity might grow,
“rise ever higher”: accepting the implications of the death of god—for example, that “there is no
more reason in what happens, no love in what will happen to you; [that] no more resting place
stands open for your heart in which to find and no longer seek”—might provide humankind the
ability to abstain from postulating metaphysical or supernatural beings in order to justify the
difficulty of life (GS 285). In others words, Nietzsche is grateful that god is dead because it
provides conditions in the culture in which investigation into human life requires scientific rigor
and honesty, yet does not permit god as a means of coping with the difficult results of this
investigation.
In conclusion, I should note that this essay has left out two very important aphorisms
which explicitly mention art as an object of gratitude (GS 78, 107), and one in which Nietzsche
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remarks on the difficulty of expressing gratitude (GS 100). Future research, in line with the
interpretive work I have done here, could read the first two aphorisms as suggesting the
following point: art—and particularly theatre—can be thought of as providing human beings
with a capacity to see themselves from a distance and from a variety of perspectives. I have
focused here primarily on the relation between gratitude and Nietzsche’s desire to live without
static values—an ability necessary after the death of god. Yet how one can do this has not really
been a part of this analysis. GS 78 and 107 could provide answers to the following questions:
how is art related to the capacity to live in this absence of static values? As we saw (III), placing
truth as the highest value can destroy value systems—Nietzsche thinks this placing truth above
all else killed the Christian God. Yet, contrary to what some critics suggest (e.g., Stern 2013,
Reginster 2009), Nietzsche does not claim falsification of the circumstances of one’s life as a
way to deal with the death of god and the collapse of values which results. Nietzsche does not
suggest art as a means of avoiding the difficulties of life. As this essay has aimed to show,
Nietzsche’s “cheerfulness” and gratitude are to be understood precisely in terms of a willingness
to face the difficult circumstances of life, one of which is the death of god (GS 343). Future
research seeking to incorporate these two important aphorisms connecting art and gratitude (GS
78 and 107) therefore cannot fail to take into account Nietzsche’s desire to confront the full
weight of the death of god while refraining from falsifying the circumstances of life (GS 2).
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